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CAPTAIN JENSEN: This presentation deals with an evaluation w e  
ran of recurrent training LOFT. Some time ago Captain Estridge 
requested tha t  a review of recurrent training LOFT be made by 
American Airlines. Captain Bob Smith and myself were lucky 
enough to  be assigned t o  conduct t h i s  evaluation. I t  was real ly  
an enjoyable experience. 
Today, I would l ike t o  provide a brief overview of how we 
went about developing the test  program and a very brief outl ine 
of a three-leg scenario we developed for the evaluation. We 
w i l l  look a t  the t e s t  guidelines tha t  we  s e t  up a t  American t o  
conduct t h i s  evaluation. The remainder of the presentation w i l l  
br ief ly  deal with the questionnaires tha t  we s e n t  t o  each one of 
the crewmembers tha t  experienced the LOFT t e s t  and what the i r  
conclusions were, then f inish with a b i t  of our conclusions on 
the program. 
I n  developing our t e s t  program we contacted some of the 
other car r ie rs  tha t  had developed some expertise i n  t h i s  area. 
Right here I would l ike t o  say tha t  we would l ike to  give a 
great deal of thanks t o  Captain Nunn and h i s  group a t  Northwest. 
I was fortunate enough t o  be able to  v i s i t  Northwest. They were 
f a r  more than gracious i n  providing information than I could 
have hoped. 
Bob Smith traveled t o  Bert Beach's group down a t  Eastern, 
and he also, talked t o  Ray Jones a t  Delta and saw some of the i r  
LOFT presentations. From t h i s  information, the information we 
got from NASA, and the Ruffell Smith report, we constructed one 
three-leg LOFT scenario for the 727 t o  use t o  conduct t h i s  t e s t .  
When we had it developed, we tested it with a couple of 
volunteer crews. The f i r s t  thing we found was tha t  we made the 
legs way too long. We reconstructed it and designed the legs t o  
be no more than an hour. Some were somewhat shorter, none of 
them shorter than 45 minutes. 
We then went to  Jess W i l l i a m s ,  our P O I ,  and got approval t o  
conduct the t e s t  i n  our recurrent training program, w i t h  the 
understanding tha t  we would accomplish on the second day of our 
recurrent training, a l l  the Appendix F requirements tha t  we d i d  
not cover i n  LOFT on the f i r s t  day. We were able t o  do t h i s  
because w e  b r i n g  a l l  of our people i n  for a two-day recurrent 
training program. 
We ran 25 crews through the t e s t  program. After the 
program was completed by each crew, and they returned t o  the i r  
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base, we waited about ten days then mailed questionnaires t o  
each crewmember's home. We were asking them t o  evaluate the 
experience tha t  they had just  gone through and give u s  any 
helpful h i n t s  that  they could. 
The crew was briefed tha t  they were reporting for a f l i g h t  
from Dallas, Fort Worth t o  Oklahoma City, and from Oklahoma C i t y  
t o  Chicago for a layover i n  Chicago. I n  actuali ty,  the f l i gh t  
went from Dallas, Fort Worth t o  Oklahoma C i t y ,  from Oklahoma 
C i t y  t o  Tulsa, and from Tulsa to  Kansas C i t y .  O n  leg one, 
winter weather was the major i t e m .  We started out with a couple 
of s t a r t  problems on the f i r s t  leg. The f i rs t  couple of crews 
tha t  w e n t  through it talked u s  out of that  because, a l l  we 
accomplished w i t h  these particular problems on the f i r s t  leg was 
t o  remove par t  of the realism of the LOFT concept which our 
i n i t i a l  20-minute concept brief helped create. The winter 
weather conditions including icing conditions on the ground and 
i n  the a i r  were a f a i r ly  good load. 
The only major a i r c ra f t  problem tha t  we ended up with on 
the f i r s t  leg of the scenario was a lever latch relay problem on 
the 7278 which the crew needed t o  solve. Although it d i d  not 
seem t o  u s  l ike  much of a problem, it i s  a f a i r ly  involved thing 
when they had t o  contend w i t h  these procedures on arr ival .  
The other item on the leg was a CAT I1 destination. When 
the crew got t o  the airplane, the log book had an autopilot 
writeup which was signed off, by the time the crew contacted 
maintenance they found maintenance had not been informed of t h i s  
and time was short. Maintenance attempted t o  ta lk  the crew into 
taking it, not a very good maintenance procedure, admittedly. We 
were anticipating the crew would refuse to  take the airplane i n  
that  si tuation, and that  presented no problems. 
Leg 2 of the t e s t  was a two-generator dispatch. We s e t  up 
for t h i s  on roll-out i n  Oklahoma C i t y  on the f i r s t  leg by 
i n s t i t u t i n g  a generator problem, which maintenance checked and 
got permission t o  dispatch i n  a two-generator operation. 
We included some more takeoff l i m i t  reviews. Dur ing  taxi- 
out the weather went below landing m i n i m u m s  which should require 
a takeoff a l ternate  and gave some opportunity for crew planning. 
Shortly a f t e r  l i f t -o f f ,  the crew experienced an engine f i r e  
warning on an engine tha t  had an operating generator. This gave 
them the i r  major problem on t h i s  leg. Basically, as soon they 
s h u t  down the engine, they were confronted w i t h  an a i r c ra f t  that  
had one generator operating and two engines. I t  gave them 
obstacle clearance considerations and a number of things t o  ta lk  
about. F i r s t  they had t o  decide where to  go. Obviously, w e  
were not going t o  Chicago any more. Tulsa became the obvious 
choice with Oklahoma C i t y  below landing l i m i t s .  When contacted, 
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the only advice given by the tower a t  OKC was tha t  they were 
presently below landing l i m i t s .  We d i d  not have anybody t r y  t o  
land below l i m i t s ,  although tha t  was a possibi l i ty  for them. 
The other i t e m  that  was b u i l t  in to  t h i s  leg was a r r iva l  
runway selection. W e  presented a northwest wind i n  Tulsa and 
they were making ar r iva ls  on Runway 26. However, i f  the crew 
requested they were able to  get  Runway 35. The w i n d s  were not 
out of l i m i t s  for  the a i r c r a f t  on Runway 35. We presented tha t  
as probably a bet ter  solution than the nonprecision approach t o  
26. However, e i ther  one was presented a s  a viable solution. I t  
d id  give a l o t  of chance for  discussion on runway selection and 
planning on conditions for your approach. 
There were things l ike  landing weight considerations and a 
great deal of crew planning. This l e g  probably more than any 
other pointed out t o  the crew tha t  i f  the Captain flew t h i s  leg 
and t r ied  t o  make a l l  the decisions, he had a real ly  hard time. 
I f  he gave the a i r c r a f t  t o  the copilot  and worked w i t h  the 
engineer on the problems, h i s  workload was a l o t  less. That d i d  
not happen very often, b u t  most of the crews agreed tha t  they 
would have rather done that  had they thought of it. I think 
they gained a l o t  from tha t  particular area. 
The third leg i s  a two-part leg and the hardest one we 
t r ied.  A case might have been made for  compounding on th i s ,  b u t  
we wanted t o  see what the crews would think of a leg l ike t h i s .  
Again, we were i n  winter weather conditions, b u t  the weather was 
not nearly a s  bad. Icing or deicing equipment was s t i l l  needed. 
There was a slow speed abort on takeoff for a minor e lec t r ica l  
problem which was easi ly  fixed, and then a clearance for 
departure again. 
The climbout was relat ively uneventful. A s  a matter of 
fact ,  the climbout was completely uneventful a t  the s t a r t  of our 
t e s t ,  b u t  we did add a couple of minor things tha t  were easily 
solved t o  give the crew something t o  do on the climb without 
g iv ing  them a high workload. We were trying t o  get them t o  
forget about why they were climbing a l l  the way t o  a l t i tude  w i t h  
nothing happening, because some of them were pre-planning the 
next event. We gave them quite a b i t  of center conversation and 
things l ike  t h i s  tha t  d i d  not require any particular action from 
the crew, b u t  kept them occupied on the climbout. Then s l igh t ly  
before we got t o  the cruising a l t i tude ,  an explosive 
depressurization problem was inst i tuted.  We preceded it 
momentarily by a wheel-well f i r e  indication, which we 
immediately extinguished ourselves, and then as they were i n  the 
descent a slow "A" system hydraulic loss was incorporated into 
the problem. This was a duplication of a wheel fa i lure  i n  the 
well. A similar problem occured on both American and another 
carr ier  t ha t  operates the 727's. 
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Now, the second par t  of t h i s  t h i r d  leg of the scenario 
happened a f t e r  the crew had made the i r  descent and had pretty 
well taken care of the i r  explosive depressurization. They were 
some distance from Tulsa and were somewhere i n  the Butler, 
Missouri area. The Captain was handed a card which stated that  
within three minutes of the time he read th i s ,  he was going t o  
be feeling so ill tha t  he would have t o  leave h i s  station. T h i s  
gave u s  an opportunity t o  give the copilot  a leg. We s e t  LOFT 
up  so tha t  the Captain was under no constraints t o  give the 
copilot  a leg. They were asked t o  r u n  t h i s  exactly l ike they 
would on the l ine .  I n  t h i s  case, of course, the Captain was out 
of the picture so h i s  copilot  was now i n  command. They had t o  
decide where they were going, some of tha t  decision possibly 
being made before the Captain became ill. I t  just  depended on 
how quickly a solution was reached. The weather si tuations 
normally were such tha t  Kansas C i t y  was the best alternative.  
Tulsa was also there, b u t  a l l  went into Kansas C i t y .  Some t r ied  
other places b u t  the weather was not forecast suitable i n  those 
places. They arrived a t  a non-"AA" s tat ion,  doing the i r  own 
altimeter-setting procedures. T h i s  leg completed the t e s t  
scenario. 
Liow, I would l ike to  run  over a l i t t l e  b i t  of what we d i d  
on the 2 5  crew t e s t s ,  exactly how we s e t  them up and what we 
t r ied  t o  accomplish. The t e s t s  were r u n  during the months of 
December and January, 1979-80. Crew selection was made a t  
random by computer. We determined tha t  the 1540 simulator 
period i n  the  727 usually resulted i n  a crew concept R-1 or 
recurrent training period, so t ha t  i s  the period we decided t o  
use for  t h i s  LOFT training exercise. M o s t  of the time the 
simulator had a fully-qualified line-crew i n  a l l  positions 
scheduled. I n  a couple of cases when that  d i d  not happen, we 
jus t  d i d  not r u n  a t e s t ;  and on three occasions, w e  were able t o  
find a line-qualified crew member (not an instructor) tha t  
volunteered t o  s i t  i n .  A s  a matter of fac t ,  J i m  Michaels, our 
training committee chairman w i t h  APA and i n  attendance a t  t h i s  
workshop, was gracious enough t o  come and f l y  copilot  on one of 
these with no advance briefing on what he would experience. 
The LOFT t e s t  was g iven  on the f i r s t  day of the two-day 
recurrent training program. A n d  by agreement, a11 Appendix k' 
requirements not given i n  LOFT were given t o  the crew on their  
second day of the training program. 
A l i t t l e  b i t  about the questionnaire before I ta lk  about 
each individual question. I t  was sent t o  each crew member, and 
out of the 75  crewmembers tha t  experienced LOFT, 67 of these 
individuals responded t o  t h i s  questionnaire, so we thought we 
got a good response. A l l  b u t  two of the questions were rated on 
one t o  nine scales, with one being a negative response and nine 
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being  the m o s t  p o s i t i v e .  W e  f e l t  t h a t  i f  w e  got a n  average  
answer of seven  or above, w e  w e r e  g e t t i n g  a n  overwhelming 
endorsement of LOFT. 
There w e r e  s e v e r a l  reasons  w h y  the answers  might  have been 
a f f e c t e d  a l i t t l e .  F i r s t ,  w e  had s e v e r a l  p roba t iona ry  f l i g h t  
eng inee r s  w h o  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  th is  e v a l u a t i o n .  They had t o  pass 
their  p r o b a t i o n a r y  check the second day. S e v e r a l  of these 
gent lemen r e q u i r e d  a n o t h e r  p e r i o d  before they got the i r  
p r o b a t i o n a r y  checks.  I a m  s u r e  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  the i r  r e sponses  a 
l i t t l e .  Second, because  there w a s  no Appendix F " r e l i e f  on t h i s  
e v a l u a t i o n ,  the second day of t r a i n i n g  w a s  v e r y  busy.  Th i rd ,  on 
8 of the 25 p e r i o d s  i n  w h i c h  t h i s  e v a l u a t i o n  w a s  conducted,  w e  
had FAA o b s e r v e r s  a long .  
T h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  w a s ,  "LOFT i s  m o r e  r ea l i s t i c  t h a n  
p r e s e n t  s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g " .  On t h i s  ques t ion ,  85% of the 
Cap ta ins ,  87% of the F i r s t  O f f i c e r s ,  and 90% of the F l i g h t  
Engineers  responded w i t h  a mark o f  7 or above. T h e  average  
answer f o r  Cap ta in  w a s  7.8,  for F/O w a s  7.67, and for  F/E w a s  
7.95. 
T h e  nex t  q u e s t i o n  asked t h e m  whether "LOFT should  help 
develop  c r e w  concept . "  Seventy- three  p e r c e n t  o f  the  Cap ta ins  
answered a t  a l e v e l  of  seven or above; 87 p e r c e n t  o f  the F i r s t  
O f f i c e r s  and 8 2  p e r c e n t  of the F/E's .  I t  seemed t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  
even m o r e  overwhelmingly endors ing  the crew-concept t h a n  the 
Cap ta ins  w e r e  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  response .  But a l l  o f  t h e m  m e t  
the c r i t e r i a  of w h a t  w e  dec ided  w a s  a h i g h l y  f a v o r a b l e  response.  
T h e  n e x t  q u e s t i o n ,  "Would the Capta in  r e c e i v e  good t r a i n i n g  
from LOFT"? Again, the  Capta in  w a s  asked that ,  and the F i r s t  
O f f i c e r  and the F l i g h t  Engineer  w e r e  each g iven  the o p p o r t u n i t y  
t o  respond t o  whether t h e y  thought  the Capta in  r e c e i v e d  good 
t r a i n i n g .  T h e  F l i g h t  Engineers  r ea l ly  t h i n k  the the Capta in  got 
it. But a l l  of  them reached our  p l a t e a u .  T h e  s a m e  q u e s t i o n  w a s  
asked abou t  the F i r s t  O f f i c e r .  The C a p t a i n ' s  response  t o  t h i s  
j u s t  missed the 7 average .  About 76% of the Cap ta ins  responded 
a t  a l e v e l  of 7 o r  above t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  
Did F l i g h t  Engineers  r e c e i v e  good t r a i n i n g  from LOFT? 
Eighty-two p e r c e n t  o f  the Cap ta ins  real ly  thought  t h e y  d i d ,  a t  a 
l e v e l  of seven or above. T h e  on ly  t h i n g  I can  say  about  the 
F l i g h t  E n g i n e e r ' s  response  i n  t ha t  p a r t i c u l a r  case w i t h  the 
p r o b a t i o n a r y  check crewmen, w a s  t h a t  we  d i d  i d e n t i f y  a problem. 
T h a t  w a s  a k ind  o f  s t i c k y  s i t u a t i o n  for  us .  W e  b r i e f e d  t h e m  
w e l l  ahead of t i m e  t h a t  they d i d  n o t  need t o  be concerned abou t  
LOFT i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  the i r  check. When a man g e t s  ano the r  day 
before he does h i s  check-r ide it probably colors h i s  opin ion ,  
s o m e w h a t .  
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T h e  nex t  ques t ion ;  w e r e  the problems that  w e  p r e s e n t e d  on 
t h i s  LOFT s c e n a r i o  rea l i s t ic .  T h e  response  w e  g o t  w a s  t h a t  77 
p e r c e n t  o f  the Cap ta ins  answered seven or above; 78 p e r c e n t  of 
the First O f f i c e r s ,  and 68  p e r c e n t  of the F l i g h t  Engineers .  The  
f irst  t w o  o r  three F l i g h t  Engineers  had a p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  problem 
on t h e i r  LOFT sequence.  I n  o u r  p r e s e n t  s i m u l a t o r s  w e  j u s t  w e r e  
n o t  able t o  s i m u l a t e  t h a t  problem very  w e l l ,  so s i n c e  it w a s  n o t  
rea l i s t ic  w e  removed it. I feel  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  the answers  f r o m  
these gent lemen.  
T h e  n e x t  t w o  q u e s t i o n s  had a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  format ,  
w i t h  f i v e  be ing  the m o s t  i d e a l  answer.  W e  j u s t  wanted t o  know 
whether t h e y  though t  the s c e n a r i o  t ha t  t h e y  had exper ienced  w a s  
too easy  or too hard. Nine ty- f ive  p e r c e n t  o f  the Cap ta ins  
answered w i t h i n  the f o u r ,  f i v e ,  or s i x  range;  78 p e r c e n t  of the 
F i r s t  O f f i c e r s ;  and 77 p e r c e n t  of  the F l i g h t  Engineers  gave u s  
w h a t  w e  cons ide red  w e r e  good g rades .  W e  d i d  n o t  want t o  ge t  f a r  
from t h e  mid-range on these q u e s t i o n s .  
D i d  w e  have too few or too many emergencies  inco rpora t ed  i n  
t h i s  r e c u r r e n t  LOFT program? F r o m  the answers  t h a t  they gave us ,  
Cap ta ins  s l i g h t l y  b e l o w  f i v e ,  t h e y  almost rated it on t h e  easy 
s i d e .  N o  one graded i t  h i g h e r  t h a n  s i x  i n  d i f f i c u l t y .  
The n e x t  q u e s t i o n ,  " W a s  LOFT a s tep i n  the r i g h t  
d i r e c t i o n " ?  Now w e  go back t o  seven as  o u r  p la teau .  Everybody 
we  f e l t  gave an  overwhelming endorsement  o f  LOFT be ing  a step i n  
the r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  
Conclusions from the LOFT eva lua t ion :  w e  feel  t h a t  c r e w  
accep tance  w a s  v e r y  good, t o  say  the  v e r y  l eas t .  I could  t e l l  
you hundreds of s tor ies  on the second i t e m ,  " C r e w  p l ann ing  and 
communication w a s  enhanced".  I n  my p a r t  as an  observer, I 
l e a r n e d  m o r e  t h a n  the c r e w s  d i d  from t h i s .  That i s  say ing  a lo t ,  
because they  l e a r n e d  a l o t  from t h i s .  I t h i n k  t h e i r  p l ann ing  
and communication w e r e  r ea l ly  enhanced. 
J u s t  one anecdote  on tha t .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  on the d e p a r t u r e  
o u t  of O k l a h o m a  C i t y  when w e  g o t  down t o  one g e n e r a t o r  and both 
packs o f f .  The  e n g i n e e r s  a lways d i d  w e l l  on accomplishing t h e i r  
tasks .  They d i d  very  w e l l  on t a k i n g  care of  the MEL i t e m  on the 
two-generator  dispatch. But n o t  a lways d i d  the Cap ta in  t r y  t o  
f i n d  o u t  w h a t  would be the impact  of the a c t i o n .  When the 
eng inee r  accomplished these tasks and the Capta in  d i d  n o t  t r y  t o  
f i n d  o u t  the i m p a c t ,  o f t e n  the eng inee r  d i d  n o t  i n i t i a t e  an  
e f for t  t o  l e t  the Capta in  know. For  i n s t a n c e ,  w e  w e r e  f l y i n g  
o u t  now w i t h  no packs on,  obv ious ly  we  could  t u r n  t h e m  on, b u t  
t h i s  i s  a h i g h  workload s i t u a t i o n  for  the eng inee r ,  and many 
t i m e s  when he w a s  v e r y  busy he would f o r g e t .  W e  would g e t  up t o  
11,000 fee t  w i t h o u t  any packs o n  and ge t  a n  a l t i t u d e  warning 
horn.  I t  made a real  good p o i n t  o f  d i s c u s s i o n .  Again, it w a s  
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n o t  a s e r i o u s  problem, b u t  it made the Capta in  r ea l i ze  tha t  he 
should  t a l k  t o  the eng inee r .  The c h e c k l i s t  w a s  complete w h a t  
d i d  t h a t  mean? I f  he had g iven  the p l a n e  t o  the copilot  and 
had, i n  fact ,  g i v e n  t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  the  t a s k  of f l y i n g  the 
a i r p l a n e  the way they wanted it flown, and t h e n  worked w i t h  the 
eng inee r ,  he would have had a l i t t l e  m o r e  t i m e .  Again, w e  did 
n o t  press t h e m  t ha t  they had done it wrong either way b u t  t h i s  
w a s  d i s c u s s e d  and the c r e w s  r e a l l y  seemed t o  respond t o  t h i s  
ve ry  w e l l .  
LOFT i s  a n  e x c e l l e n t  s e l f - a n a l y s i s  tool.  W e  had one 
Cap ta in  w h o  cou ld  f l y  ve ry  w e l l  b u t  r e a l l y  d i d  n o t  respond ve ry  
w e l l  as  a Capta in .  By the second l e g ,  th i s  i n d i v i d u a l  had been 
able t o  see, f r o m  t h i n g s  he w a s  expe r i enc ing ,  t h a t  he needed t o  
t a k e  a much m o r e  a c t i v e  par t .  The man made h is  own c o r r e c t i o n  
wi thou t  anybody having t o  s a y  any th ing  t o  h i m  abou t  it. I t  w a s  
v e r y  impress ive  t o  m e  t o  see what a g r e a t  change the man made. 
C r e w  accep tance  of s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  procedures w a s  
enhanced i n  s e v e r a l  cases. And, i n  one case, the l e v e r - l a t c h  
r e l a y  problem, w e  m a d e  s o m e  minor ad jus tmen t s  t o  the o p e r a t i n g  
manual t o  make it a l i t t l e  more se l f - exp lana to ry .  
LOFT d e f i n i t e l y  deve lops  r e s o u r c e  management s k i l l s .  How 
the  c r e w  worked t o g e t h e r  and  h o w  t h e y  used w h a t  t h e y  had 
a v a i l a b l e ,  r e a l l y  w a s  b rough t  o u t  i n  t h i s  e v a l u a t i o n .  
Now, j u s t  a l i t t l e  about  w h e r e  w e  are  now. W e  have 
developed s i x  s c e n a r i o s  f o r  t h e  Boeing 727. These are two-leg 
r e c u r r e n t - t y p e  s c e n a r i o s .  A t  American, w e  would l i k e  a l i t t l e  
b i t  of t i m e  a t  the end of the LOFT period t o  be able t o  
c o n c e n t r a t e  on a f e w  other hands-on i t e m s .  They have n o t  been 
approved y e t ,  because  it r e q u i r e s  a three-leg s c e n a r i o  a t  the  
p r e s e n t  t i m e .  A l l  the  s i m u l a t i o n  and navaids  have been updated 
f o r  the  narrow-body a i rc raf t  a t  American. W e  have a l l  the  
navaids  r e q u i r e d  f o r  the LOFT programs t h a t  w e  have developed i n  
t h e  s i m u l a t o r s .  W e  have updated s o m e  o f  the communication 
capabi l i t i es  i n  ou r  older s i m u l a t o r s .  W e  have through the ATA 
r eques t ed  s o m e  r e g u l a t o r y  changes t o  the p r e s e n t  LOFT governing 
r u l e s .  S c e n a r i o  approval  and i n s t r u c t o r  t r a i n i n g  i s  s t i l l  t o  be 
accomplished i n  ou r  program. W e  are  i n  a ho ld ing  mode r i g h t  
now. 
From my own expe r i ences ,  LOFT, t h a t  i s  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n q  
LOFT, i s  v e r y  f i n e  t r a i n i n g .  I t  could  be used for  a check-ride, 
b u t  w e  would lose the v a l u e  of r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  LOFT. The 
crewmember has to  be able t o  feel t h a t  he is i n  t r a i n i n g ,  i n  a 
l e a r n i n g  s i t u a t i o n ,  t ha t  he i s  expe r i enc ing  t h i s  rather t h a n  
beinc: checked on it. And i f  he i s  able t o  do t h a t ,  he i s  going 
t o  go  o u t  there and r e a l l y  ge t  something o u t  of it. H e  i s  going  
t o  operate it the way he t h i n k s  he should.  T h e  problems a 
98 
crewmember expe r i ences  are the m o s t  v a l u a b l e  pa r t  o f  t h i s  
t r a i n i n g .  T h e  crewmember r e a l l y  l e a r n s  from these problems 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  those tha t  are se l f - induced .  
T h e  debrief i s  ve ry  impor tan t .  H e  canno t  be made t o  t h i n k  
t h a t  you have g o t  a "pat" s o l u t i o n  and t h a t ' s  the o n l y  one. H e  
has got to  know tha t  you are i n t e r e s t e d  i n  h i s  s o l u t i o n  and you 
r e a l l y  want t o  e x p l o r e  the idea w i t h  him. W e  worked very  hard .  
A t  t i m e s  w e  d i d n ' t  ach ieve  t o t a l  c r e w  b r i e f i n g ;  many t i m e s  w e  
d id .  S o m e t i m e s  the c r e w  w a s  h e s i t a n t  t o  s t a r t  t a l k i n g ,  we  would 
set  t h e m  up by ask ing  q u e s t i o n s ,  run  through the overview o f  the 
leg,  etc. ,  and t h e n  a s k  t h e m  how t h e y  though t  the s e s s i o n  went. 
Somehow w e  would g e t  the c r e w  i n t o  the d e b r i e f .  
Discuss ion  
CAPTAIN CAVANAGH: Don, i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  i n c a p a c i t a t i o n ,  h o w  do 
you induce  i t ?  W e  have o c c a s i o n a l l y  found a problem i f  the 
c a p t a i n  or  f irst  officer w a s  too good a n  actor, t h a t  the others 
became concerned t h a t  it w a s  real .  You have t o  establish a ,  
"Don' t  worry guys,  I ' m  t a k i n g  myself  o u t  of it, b u t  I ' m  n o t  
r e a l l y  s ick ,"  atmosphere. O t h e r w i s e  they want t o  g e t  o u t  o f  the 
s i m u l a t o r ,  r u s h  h i m  t o  the hospi ta l  and s h u t  the w h o l e  t h i n g  
down. 
CAPTAIN JENSEN:  W e  d i d  have t h a t  happen once,  and the  first 
f l i g h t  a t t e n d a n t  ( t he  other i n s t r u c t o r )  and I jumped up and l e t  
t h e m  know tha t  w e  had e v e r y t h i n g  under  c o n t r o l .  They g o t  the 
message, and t h a t  is h o w  we  handled it wi thou t  t a l k i n g  t o  the 
c r e w .  T h i s  young eng inee r  t o l d  u s  i n  d e b r i e f i n g ,  "I  c a n ' t  
b e l i e v e  you guys,  w e  had a guy dying i n  there, and you w e r e  
going on  w i t h  the period l i k e  noth ing  had happened." (Laughter )  
However, i n  o u r  brief e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h i s ,  m o s t  c a p t a i n s  are 
such crummy actors tha t  you c o u l d n ' t  p o s s i b l y  mistake it f o r  the 
real t h i n g .  (Laugh te r )  
CAPTAIN ERICKSON: I j u s t  wanted t o  a s k  you w h a t  your  f i n a l  t i m e  
breakdown w a s .  How much t i m e  have you applied for  LOFT, and the 
other "hands-on" t h i n g s  you w e r e  r e f e r r i n g  t o ?  
CAPTAIN JENSEN:  I w a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  the normal t y p e  o f  t r a i n i n g .  
Maybe w e  would l i k e  t o  review a few t h i n g s ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
because they have done something wrong i n  the LOFT e x e r c i s e .  I n  
m o s t  cases, t h e y  have a l r e a d y  l e a r n e d  the  l e s s o n ,  and it is  hard 
t o  go  back and t e a c h  t h e m  something t h a t  they have already 
d i scove red  they should  or should  n o t  do.  However, w e  decided a t  
American tha t  w e  would l i k e  t o  have s o m e  t i m e  for  procedures  
training--maybe f l y  a Category I1 approach, b u t  there are 
v a r i o u s  o p i n i o n s  o n  that .  W e  d i scove red  t h i s  need e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
the case of e n g i n e e r s .  They go  through a program i n  w h i c h  t h e  
eng inee r  g e t s  t o  practice a l l  of the basic o p e r a t i o n s  o f  the 
systems and t o  r e v i e w  a l l  of the procedures ,  abnormals  and t h i s  
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t ype  o f  t h i n g .  On the  second day,  he g e t s  a p r o f i c i e n c y  check.  
Another  eng inee r  go ing  through LOFT i s  a l i t t l e  h e s i t a n t  t o  t a k e  
that  p r o f i c i e n c y  check i f  he has t o  be compared a g a i n s t  the one 
who got to  practice a l l  of tha t  s t u f f .  W e  cannot  s chedu le  
everyone f o r  the c r e w  concept  t r a i n i n g  (LOFT). W e  are going t o  
have s o m e  people r e c e i v i n g  r e g u l a r  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g ,  g e t t i n g  
procedures  practice, and others r e c e i v i n g  LOFT. On the second 
day, t h e y  a l l  g e t  their  check.  If w e  had e x t r a  t i m e ,  we  would 
l i k e  t o  use  it for t h i n g s  t ha t  the LOFT e x e r c i s e  d i d  n o t  
address. Perhaps he would l i k e  a l i t t l e  practice j u s t  t o  g e t  up 
t o  speed.  
CAPTAIN CAVANAGH: D o  you have one or t w o  i n s t r u c t o r s  d u r i n g  the 
(LOFT) e v a l u a t i o n ,  and w h a t  are your  f u t u r e  thoughts?  
CAPTAIN JENSEN:  W e  had t w o  i n s t r u c t o r s  i n  the s i m u l a t o r .  I 
feel  t h a t  the i n s t r u c t o r  running the ses s ion - - th i s  is  a p e r s o n a l  
feel ing--should be a l i n e - q u a l i f i e d  person .  Bob S m i t h  and I r a n  
t h i s  e v a l u a t i o n .  I r a n  abou t  h a l f ,  and he r a n  h a l f .  W e  d id  
s o m e  w i t h  f l i g h t  eng inee r  check-airmen and s o m e  w i t h  o u r  f l i g h t  
eng inee r  s i m u l a t o r  i n s t r u c t o r s - - e i t h e r  way it worked f i n e ,  b u t  
you j u s t  need t ha t  l i n e  expe r i ence  i n  there t o  operate it. W e  
p i cked  a c a p t a i n  check-airmen simply because the problems are 
normally se t  up and g iven  by the  c a p t a i n .  I would r e a l l y  f e e l  
short-handed,  though, w i t h  o n l y  one  i n s t r u c t o r  i n  the s imula to r .  
CAPTAIN DISCH:  I j u s t  wanted t o  c l a r i fy  your  proposed t i m e -  
breakdown. Is it the three hour s ,  twenty minutes  for LOFT, and 
f o r t y  minutes  l e f t  ove r  f o r  other t h i n g s ,  t ha t  you are apply ing  
f o r ?  
CAPTAIN J E N S E N :  N o ,  w e  are apply ing  f o r  r e l i e f  from the three 
hour s ,  twenty minutes  p r o v i s i o n  (Advisory C i r c u l a r  120-35). W e  
would l i k e  t o  have t w o  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  segments.  W e  found tha t  
a f t e r  a w h i l e ,  a l t hough  it i s  n i c e  t o  have s o m e  l a g s  ( q u i e t  
periods i n  the LOFT s c e n a r i o )  i n  there, w e  had q u i t e  a f e w  lags 
they  way we  had it des igned .  Because of t ha t  w e  had t o  p u t  i n  
t h i n g s  l i k e  150 k n o t  t a i l w i n d s  I n  order t o  g e t  eve ry th ing  done. 
I t  w a s  also r e a l l y  bo r ing  and the guys d i d  n o t  l i k e  a l l  of the 
q u i e t  periods. T h a t  i s  why we  wanted shorter l e g s .  W e  d i d  n o t  
l i k e  t o  e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  r e p o s i t i o n  the s i m u l a t o r .  W e  f e e l  t h a t  a 
coup le  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  l e g s  are adequate .  
CAPTAIN DISCH: So then ,  you e s s e n t i a l l y  a p p l i e d  for no-time, 
j u s t  t w o  l e g s  and a passover?  
CAPTAIN JENSEN: I would s a y  t h a t  i s  a c c u r a t e .  Would you Walt? 
CAPTAIN ESTRIDGE: Y e s ,  the ATA recommendation i s  t h a t  s o m e  o f  
the LOFT Advisory C i r c u l a r  would be changed t o  a l l o w  each 
carrier t o  u t i l i z e  segments r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the i r  needs.  W e  
would a lso l i k e  t o  l e a v e  adequate  t i m e  t o  practice the t h i n g s  
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Don was talking about--for the second officer/engineer t o  get 
some systems work. The combination of t i m e  should be flexible 
so tha t  it can s u i t  each c a r r i e r ' s  specific needs. 
CAPTAIN WHITEHEAD: Scenario leg-development is  a significant 
concern of ours, especially for a i r c ra f t  l ike  the L-1011 and 
DC-8 which f l y  longer legs. We would l ike the ab i l i t y  t o  
shorten these segments electronically and s t i l l  preserve as much 
realism as possible. Since we cannot in te r jec t  specific 
maneuver-type training under the LOFT Advisory Circular, we 
chose to  go w i t h  four legs. I f  we are going t o  continue with 
t h i s  philosophy i n  the s t r i c t  LOFT atmosphere, then we would 
l ike to  observe a s  many legs as possible. The ab i l i t y  t o  
shorten a leg would be beneficial t o  u s  i f  we are going t o  
continue w i t h  the three hour, twenty minute system. However, i f  
we could a f fec t  revisions i n  the Advisory Circular t o  allow for 
two representative legs and then additional training pursuant to  
the company's needs and the further training the regulatory 
agency requires, t h i s  would be most beneficial  t o  u s .  
CAPTAIN JENSEN:  One possibi l i ty  i s  "to plan for a very long leg, 
l ike i n  the Ruffell S m i t h  s tudy ,  and then cause a diversion for 
one reason or another, shortening the leg.  We have plans t o  do 
tha t  unless it proves unacceptable. We planned a segment from 
OKC t o  ORD, they got all the paperwork, e tc .  for tha t  route, b u t  
caused them t o  divert  t o  TUL, a very short leg. 
CAPTAIN BEACH: Jay (Whitehead), as  par t  of what Don (Jensen) 
was saying, you mentioned tha t  on a long-haul airplane l ike your 
L-1011, you program a shorter leg. There i s  no reason why you 
cannot take a long-haul airplane and never get  out of the local 
area i f  you choose to  write it tha t  way. You can develop a very 
effective training exercise w i t h  only 350 miles i n  it. 
CAPTAIN WHITEHEAD: B u t ,  a f t e r  a while your crews real ize  it, 
"Well, I know we are not going t o  Europe today, we'l l  go over 
and get coffee." "Since we are i n  the  simulator, we're going t o  
deviate. 'I 
CAPTAIN CAVANAGII: I would l i k e  to  comment on tha t  aspect too. 
The 747s i n  our system do not f ly  between SFO and LAX except 
that  it i s  ent i re ly  possible that  you could have weather 
problems i n  one place and the airplane has to  be repositioned, 
or it needs t o  go to  maintenance. There are reasons t o  do that ,  
as ferry f l i gh t s  or  whatever. I t h i n k  you can create 
believable, acceptable, short-haul operations for a long-haul 
airplane. 
CAPTAIN NUNN: I n  addition to  that ,  i f  you look a t  the Advisory 
Circular carefully, it says tha t  on long-haul operations you can 
shorten the cruise segment by going t o  position A from position 
B,  and so on. That came up on one of our scenarios from Seattle 
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t o  Tokyo, and the airplane went from Seat t le  to  Tokyo. After 
reaching cruise a l t i tude,  everything came t o  a ha l t ,  and they 
were slewed (repositioned) t o  a point 100 miles from touchdown. 
Everything was recalculated, the fuel burn,  etc. ,  and a l l  of the 
paperwork was there. Our crews f e l t  tha t  it was no problem. 
They f e l t  tha t  was r e a l i s t i c  for  a 747 scenario. You do not 
have t o  stay i n  the local area, b u t  I agree w i t h  Bert (Beach) 
tha t  tha t  i s  very effective too. W e  had another, Seatt le or 
Portland t o  Honolulu--they never got t o  Honolulu--they went back 
t o  Seat t le  or Portland. They preferred that .  But ,  you can do 
ei ther ,  a t  l ea s t  enough t o  do away with the expectation of 
always having a diversion. 
CAPTAIN J E N S E N :  I agree with that.  After a while we get used 
t o  diversions i f  tha t  i s  a l l  we do. Sooner or l a t e r  w e  have t o  
get away from that.  We have not planned anything for our 
"wide-bodies" so f a r ,  so I don't know. 
CAPTAIN MICHAELS: We have participated i n  the LOFT sessions, 
and I fee l  the benefits  of making an approach into a strange 
airport ,  the navaids, the unfamiliarity of the area, and so 
forth: f a r  outweigh the detrimental effects  of repositioning the 
simulator. I do not think tha t  you lose a s  much realism tha t  
way a s  you do by staying i n  the local area a l l  the time. 
MR. HUETTNER: I jus t  wanted t o  reference what Tom (Nunn) was 
saying about the provision i n  the Advisory Circular, it appears 
i n  paragraph 1 3 ,  "For operators who normally operate lengthy 
route segments, the simulator may be repositioned dur ing  the 
LOFT period while i n  the cruise configuration and cruise 
a l t i tude."  We have no problem with tha t  concept, so long as it 
i s  done i n  a r e a l i s t i c  nature. 
CAPTAIN RISCHAR: There are a l o t  of people with a l o t  of 
programs here, and it i s  obvious tha t  developing the training 
programs, scenarios, etc.  requires a l o t  of e f for t .  Is it 
possible t o  get copies of scenarios and other materials from 
some of the individuals here? 
CAPTAIN BEACH: One of our principal operating inspectors (FAA) 
said tha t  i f  any one of our scenarios got out, we would have to  
write a l l  s i x  over again, b u t  we can certainly help you out. 
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